UNITED
NATIONS

A

General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/214
9 June 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Fiftieth session
Items 88 and 94 of the
preliminary list*

INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES TRANSMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 73 e OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR

Note verbale dated 5 June 1995 from the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

1. With reference to the note of the Secretary-General dated 9 March 1995 (TR 100 (2) GEN), the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations has the honour to call his attention to the information provided by the Mission in its note verbale dated 20 June 1994 (A/49/184), as required by Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations, the terms of which remain valid.

2. Since the Government of Portugal continues to be prevented de facto from exercising its responsibilities for the administration of the Non-Self-Governing Territory of East Timor, owing to the latter's illegal occupation by a third country thus preventing its people from exercising freely their right to self-determination, it remains unable to provide any information concerning that Territory under Article 73 e of the Charter. Nevertheless, the Government of Portugal would like to draw attention to the following.

3. Upon the invitation of the Government of Indonesia, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Bacre Ndiaye, paid a visit to East Timor in July 1994. In his report (E/CN.4/1995/61/Add.1), he points out that most of the provisions that have been adopted by the Commission since 1992 on the situation of human rights in East Timor are still to be implemented and urges the

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Indonesian authorities, inter alia, to conduct proper investigations of the Santa Cruz killings of 12 November 1991, to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators, to determine the fate and the whereabouts of the missing persons, to grant compensation to the victims or to their relatives and to prevent the occurrence of further killings.

The Special Rapporteur, who speaks of an atmosphere of fear and suspicion currently prevailing in East Timor, is of the opinion that no confidence-building measures can be effective and no solution to the problems confronting East Timor can be found before justice has been done and he maintains that the conditions that allowed the Santa Cruz brutality to occur are still present. Mr. Ndiaye writes also that a drastic reduction of the military presence in East Timor is a prerequisite for confidence-building measures. His report concludes, moreover, that the shooting at the Dili cemetery was not an isolated incident but a planned military operation.

4. In fact, the human rights situation continued to be a source of deep concern in the second half of 1994 and its serious deterioration during the early months of the present year has been consistently reported.

Violent incidents occurred in Dili on 14 July 1994, in November 1994 and on 9 January 1995 and in Baucau on 1 January 1995 during which five people were reported killed, several injured and many arrested. It appears that ethnic tensions (between East Timorese and non-East Timorese) as well as religious provocations caused by the population transfers fostered by the Indonesian authorities have contributed to the occurrence of most of those incidents. These apparent new ethnic and religious factors thus appear to be aggravating an already intolerable human rights situation prevailing in the Territory.

5. On 12 November 1994, 29 East Timorese students entered the United States Embassy in Jakarta and displayed banners calling for the United States President to seek the release of the East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmão, to push for his participation in peace talks and to support a referendum on the political future of East Timor. With the cooperation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), they were allowed to depart for Portugal on 24 November 1994.

All these events were widely reported by the international media, present in large numbers in Jakarta to cover the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting that was being held on that occasion.

6. A most serious incident, however, was to take place in the region of Liquiça on 12 January 1995, when six East Timorese civilians (José Nunes, Victor Nunes, Augusto Pinto Nunes, Abel Nunes, Américo Araújo and Osório Soares) were killed by the Indonesian armed forces. The occupying authorities maintained, in the beginning, that they were guerrilla fighters who had been killed while engaged in action by the Indonesian military. The National Human Rights Commission, however, after conducting an on-the-spot investigation, concluded that the six were in fact local civilians who had been tortured and shot by the soldiers. Another investigation by an "Officers' Honour Council" followed and, according to Indonesian military sources, two soldiers will be

court-martialled for their role in the killing and other officers and soldiers will be the subject of administrative and disciplinary measures.

7. This brutal incident in Liquiça, which prompted several embassies in Jakarta to express their concern to the Indonesian authorities requesting that the matter be fully investigated, highlighted the serious deterioration of the human rights situation in the Territory after the APEC summit, as if the Indonesian authorities were to take their revenge for the restraint they had had to exercise before the international press correspondents gathered in Jakarta (and in Dili too) for that occasion.

East Timor was swept during the first months of the present year by a wave of terror, when hooded "ninja" gangs roamed the streets of Dili and villages in rural areas attacking those supposed to be opposed to Indonesian rule. Amnesty International reported that the authorities reacted to the unrest in the Territory with arbitrary detention, beatings and torture, as exemplified by the handling of the 9 January protest at the University of Dili.

8. More East Timorese have been sentenced to prison terms for their peaceful political activities. That was the case with José António Neves, a theology student, arrested in East Java in May 1994 and sentenced in February to four years in prison, accused of seeking to gain international support for East Timor's independence by sending faxes with information on human rights abuses in East Timor to overseas non-governmental organizations.

Isaac Soares, Miguel de Deus, Pantaleão Amaral, Rosalino dos Santos and Pedro Fátima Tilman were sentenced to 20 months' imprisonment for taking part in a peaceful pro-independence demonstration staged before a party of foreign journalists on 14 April 1994 in Dili.

In connection with the peaceful demonstration of 9 January at the University of Dili, José António Belo was sentenced to 17 months in jail. After the reading of the sentence he appealed to the Indonesian authorities to stop torturing the imprisoned East Timorese, referring to torture inflicted on a group of prisoners in the Becora military prison. Lemos Barreto and Inácio Jesus Santos (20 months), José Pinto, Pedro Costa and Alex Costa (26 months), Carlos Barreto and José Amaral (30 months) were the others to whom jail terms were handed down by Indonesian courts for taking part in the demonstration.

Thus, in contradiction with the commitments undertaken before the Commission on Human Rights and in the last rounds of talks over the question of East Timor held under the auspices of the Secretary-General, not only were those East Timorese already convicted for non-violent activities not released, but more have also been recently sentenced for engaging in peaceful political action.

9. Again according to Amnesty International, hundreds of suspected supporters of independence for East Timor were subjected to short-term detention, ill-treatment and harassment during 1994.

10. While some progress was made as regards access to East Timor, it is a matter of fact that human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch/Asia have still not been able to visit the Territory. It is also specially worrisome that, since early January, foreign journalists have been barred from the Territory.

Here again appeals made by the Commission on Human Rights to the Indonesian authorities to grant access to East Timor by human rights and humanitarian organizations, as well as by international media, have received no positive response.

11. The fourth and fifth rounds of talks on the question of East Timor held under the auspices of the Secretary-General took place on 6 May 1994 and on 9 January 1995, respectively.

Since the positions of the Governments of Portugal and Indonesia on the Territory's status remain far apart, efforts so far have concentrated on defining and carrying out a number of confidence-building measures, among which those pertaining to the improvement of the human rights situation are predominant, though with limited practical results, as may be seen from the previous paragraphs.

Certain important steps forward were made, however, at both meetings regarding the encouragement of the dialogue among East Timorese and of contacts between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries and leading East Timorese belonging to different political movements and tendencies. On 4 October 1994, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal met in Luxembourg with a delegation of supporters of integration. Similarly, on 6 October 1994, in New York, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia met with those in favour of self-determination.

It was further decided that in the fifth round of talks the Secretary-General would facilitate and offer the necessary arrangements for the convening of an all-inclusive East Timorese dialogue, as a contribution to his own efforts. This dialogue is supposed to address informally a number of practical ideas and possible actions that could lead to the improvement of the situation in the Territory and ease tension over the issue as a whole. It will not replace the ongoing talks at ministerial level but, instead, act as a kind of advisory forum for the Secretary-General. A first meeting is scheduled to take place from 2 to 4 June next in Burg Schlainning (Austria), following a generous offer made by the Government of Austria.

Having consistently favoured the association of the East Timorese in this process and bearing in mind that the interests of the inhabitants of the colonial territories are paramount, in accordance with Article 73 of the Charter, Portugal views this development as particularly positive. It is hoped that an open, free and constructive spirit may prevail, allowing common grounds of understanding to emerge, thus paving the way to the formulation of positive and useful proposals on the issue.

12. On 1 March 1995, the Commission on Human Rights adopted by consensus a new Chairman's statement on the situation of human rights in East Timor, following those approved in 1992 and 1994, and resolution 1993/97 adopted in 1993. In

considering the issue, the Commission had before it the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted at the previous session (E/CN.4/1995/72), the above-mentioned report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on his visit to East Timor in July 1994 (E/CN.4/1995/61/Add.1) and information regarding the action taken by Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups of the Commission on Human Rights concerning East Timor (E/CN.4/1995/31 and Add.2, E/CN.4/1995/34, E/CN.4/1995/36 and E/CN.4/1995/61).

It is worth recalling that the Commission expressed its deep concern at the continuing reports of human rights violations in the Territory and again urged the Government of Indonesia to live up to its commitments regarding the improvement of human rights in East Timor, namely, the full investigation of the 12 November killing in Santa Cruz, and in particular of the fate of those people still missing and the circumstances surrounding the incident; the early release of the East Timorese convicted; and the granting of access to human rights and humanitarian organizations and the international media. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is to be invited to visit East Timor in 1995 and to submit a report to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-second session. Relevant thematic Special Rapporteurs and/or Working Groups of the Commission are also to be invited, taking into consideration requests made by them, when necessary, for assistance in fulfilment of their duties.

13. The Government of Indonesia, instead of reducing their troop strength in East Timor (as it has been pledging for years), in fact - according to all testimonies available - significantly increased their number during the months that followed the demonstrations staged in November in Jakarta and Dili, as mentioned above.

An unexpected source, the Foreign Minister of Australia, Senator Gareth Evans, said publicly on 16 May 1995:

> "There is no doubt there is an oppressive military presence in East Timor far and away beyond that which is needed for the security of the place."

Mr. Evans's comments were prompted by an Australian nurse's claims of atrocities in East Timor. Mr. Simon de Faux, who served for two months in East Timor as a volunteer health worker for the Catholic Church (February-April 1995), said he had treated people there who had been tortured, raped and beaten by Indonesian soldiers. He added that they included women who had been repeatedly raped, men tortured by being tied naked to a metal bed and having electric charges sent through their bodies and youths almost drowned in barrels of water. There were also many beating victims and torture was fairly common (see The Age, 16 May 1995). While dismissing these charges, the Indonesian authorities stated, nevertheless, that an investigation into the matter would be carried out.

14. The International Court of Justice met from 30 January to 16 February 1995, under the provisions of articles 43 to 47 of its Statute, to hear the oral arguments of Portugal and Australia in the case relating to East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), brought before the Court by an Application filed by Portugal on 22 February 1991 instituting proceedings against Australia.

These oral arguments followed two rounds of written pleadings consisting of a Memorial and a Counter-Memorial by Portugal and Australia, respectively, as well as a Reply by Portugal and a Rejoinder by Australia, all duly filed within the prescribed time-limits.

In its Application, Portugal contends that Australia, by negotiating with Indonesia an agreement relating to the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf in the area of the Timor Gap (signed on 11 December 1989), by ratifying that agreement and by initiating its implementation, as well as by negotiating the delimitation of the shelf and by excluding any negotiation on these matters with Portugal, had caused serious legal and moral damage to the people of East Timor and to Portugal as administering Power, which will also become material damage if the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources begins.

The International Court of Justice is now deliberating on the case and a decision will be taken in due course on a date still to be announced.

15. In addition to these reports, a number of official United Nations documents have been circulated regarding the situation prevailing in East Timor. It would be worth recalling here those documents and their references:

(a) Letter dated 18 July 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General on behalf of the European Union (A/49/267-S/1994/853);

(b) Letter dated 15 November 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

16. The Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations has the honour to request that the present note be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under items 88 and 94 of the preliminary list.

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/215
S/1995/475
12 June 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Items 70, 80, 86, 97 (a), 97 (i), 107, 109, 110, 112, 114 and 149 of the preliminary list*
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION: TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR THE ERADICATION OF POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, INCLUDING QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE WORLD SOCIAL SITUATION AND TO YOUTH, AGEING, DISABLED PERSONS AND THE FAMILY
ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN
INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS
MEASURES TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

* A/50/50/Rev.1.

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Letter dated 8 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Delhi Declaration issued at the eighth meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), held at New Delhi from 2 to 4 May 1995 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex is circulated as an official document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under items 70, 80, 86, 97 (a) and (i), 107, 109, 110, 112, 114 and 149 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Prakash SHAH

ANNEX

Delhi Declaration, issued at the eighth meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, held at New Delhi from 2 to 4 May 1995

Introduction

1. The Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Her Excellency Begum Khaleda Zia, the King of Bhutan, His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck, the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, the President of the Republic of Maldives, His Excellency Mr. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, the Prime Minister of Nepal, the Rt. Hon. Manmohan Adhikari, His Excellency Mr. Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari and the President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Her Excellency Mrs. Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, met at the Eight Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) at New Delhi, India, on 2-4 May 1995.

SAARC decade

2. The Heads of State or Government expressed their satisfaction on the achievements of the first decade of SAARC and resolved to celebrate its completion of the first decade both in the individual member States and collectively. They endorsed the proposal of the Council of Ministers to convene a commemorative session of the Council on the theme: "SAARC - Vision of the second decade" to identify the areas on which SAARC should focus in its second decade.

Regional cooperation

3. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed their resolve to intensify regional cooperation in order to accelerate the process of promoting the welfare and improving the quality of life of the peoples of South Asia. They reiterated their commitment to the principles and objectives enshrined in the SAARC charter, particularly, to the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. They recalled their conviction that in an increasingly interdependent world, regional cooperation was a dynamic instrument for promoting economic prosperity, mutual understanding and good neighbourly relations to achieve the objectives of peace and stability in South Asia. In that context, a climate of peace and stability would contribute to the economic growth.

Eradication of poverty in South Asia

4. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed their commitment to the eradication of poverty in South Asia, preferably by the year 2002 A.D. through an agenda of action.

5. The leaders endorsed the recommendations of the Finance/Planning Ministers' Meeting held at Dhaka in July 1994, which recommended that a mechanism should be set up that would act as a forum for the exchange of information on poverty eradication programmes, in the context of the policies and strategies adopted, particularly exchange of information on technologies that were relevant to efforts at poverty eradication. They agreed that the process could be strengthened by sharing and exchanging relevant studies carried out by independent research institutions and experts. The mechanism would be in the form of a three-tier institutional structure as recommended in the report and would meet once a year. They noted that such a mechanism had been set up enabling the procedures of exchange of information to commence and welcomed the offer of India to host the first round of the three-tier mechanism.

6. The Heads of State or Government directed that the next meeting of Finance/Planning Ministers consider the efficacy of such mechanism towards eradicating poverty in the region and report on the progress achieved to the ninth SAARC summit, through the Council of Ministers.

7. In that context, they decided to declare 1995 as the "SAARC Year of Poverty Eradication".

8. Acknowledging that the abiding human qualities of dignity, creativity and productive potential were eroded by chronic poverty, the Heads of State or Government reiterated their commitment to empowering the poor for enhanced growth consistent with human development and equity.

9. Recognizing that poverty was a complex multi-dimensional problem with origins in both national and international domains, country-specific programmes to tackle poverty and international efforts supporting national efforts and the parallel process of creating a supportive international environment conducive to economic growth and social development of developing countries, were crucial for a solution to the problem. The World Summit for Social Development recognized the need for focusing the attention of the international community on and supporting the special needs of countries and regions in which there were substantial concentrations of people living in poverty, in particular those in South Asia and which faced serious difficulties in achieving social and economic development. The Heads of State or Government reiterated their commitment to eradicate poverty and noted with appreciation the outcome of the World Summit for Social Development

10. The Heads of State or Government committed themselves to addressing the fundamental causes of poverty and to provide for the basic needs of all. They reaffirmed their commitment to work for guaranteeing the realization of the rights of all, in particular those of the poor, to food, work, shelter, health, education, resources and information.

11. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed their commitment to provide expanded opportunities to the poor to enhance their overall capacities and improving living conditions and to adequate economic and social protection during unemployment, disability and old age. While recognizing the need to improve, expand and deregulate markets to promote sustained economic growth, they felt it was essential to mitigate any negative features created by the

market forces and make all efforts to make the market friendly to the poor. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the necessity to ensure that financial systems and other public policies are geared towards poverty eradication and warned against increase in socially divisive disparities.

12. The Heads of State or Government agreed that the Governments of SAARC countries would have to play a lead role in promoting the support structures needed for poverty eradication, including people's institutions and non-governmental organizations in the context of organizing the people and fostering decentralization and local self-governance and encouraging organization of the poor, in the context of their social and economic interests.

SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)

13. The Heads of State or Government noted with satisfaction that subsequent to the signing of the Framework Agreement on the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) during their seventh summit at Dhaka in April 1993, the first round of trade negotiations to exchange trade concessions among member States have been completed. They directed that all necessary steps should be taken to facilitate ratification by all member States and operationalize SAPTA by the end of 1995 as mandated.

14. The leaders reiterated their firm belief that the operationalization of SAPTA would herald the beginning of a new and significant process of regional cooperation and would lend strength to SAARC as an institution for promoting the welfare of the peoples of South Asia.

15. In view of the fast-changing international economic environment, creation of major trading and economic groupings, establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) subsequent to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and unilateral economic liberalization measures being adopted by member countries, the Heads of State or Government emphasized the urgency of broadening and deepening cooperation within a specific and rapid time-frame in the core areas of trade and economic relations in the region. Those developments called for added urgency to achieve more progress towards operationalization of SAPTA and intensification of cooperation to expand regional trade. To that end, they decided that the "components" and "additional measures" identified in articles 4 and 6 respectively of the SAPTA Agreement should be implemented.

Integrated Programme of Action

16. The Heads of State or Government noted the progress made through the Integrated Programme of Action covering a number of crucial areas and activities.

Regional centres

17. The leaders welcomed the establishment of the SAARC Documentation Centre (SDC) at New Delhi in May 1994 and the SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC) at Dhaka in January 1995.

Women in development

18. Noting that increased political and social consciousness in the region had highlighted the issues of elimination of gender-disparity and empowerment of women, which were essential for their socio-economic development, the Heads of State or Government underlined the urgency of addressing those issues through further affirmative action.

19. The leaders endorsed the "Kathmandu resolution on women and family health", adopted by the Ministerial Conference on Women and Family Health at Kathmandu in November 1993, and expressed satisfaction that appropriate programmes were being undertaken to implement the resolution at the national level by the member States.

20. The leaders noted the progress in the implementation of the plan of action to mark 1991-2000 as the SAARC Decade of the Girl-Child, and requested the Council of Ministers to conduct a comprehensive mid-decade review for presentation to the ninth SAARC summit.

21. Recognizing the serious threat faced by certain groups of girl children in especially difficult circumstances including those orphaned, disabled and exploited, the leaders decided that an urgent appraisal of the situation of those children be undertaken by the Council of Minister and specific recommendations be presented to the ninth SAARC summit.

22. Considering that the exploitation of the girl child was a direct reflection of the status of women in society, the leaders reaffirmed their resolve to take necessary measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and girl children.

Children

23. The Heads of State or Government expressed satisfaction that the annual reviews of the situation of children in SAARC countries for the years 1993 and 1994 had been completed, which indicated a reduction in infant mortality and significant progress in the immunization programme for children in the region.

24. Recalling the mid-decade goals of the World Summit for Children, the Heads of State or Government resolved to intensify their efforts both at the national and regional levels for attainment of those goals.

25. The leaders welcomed that all member States had become party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. They felt that the recently held Cairo International Conference on Population and Development in September 1994 and the Copenhagen World Summit on Social Development in March 1995 had imparted fresh impetus to the ongoing efforts for the survival, protection and development of children in South Asia.

Youth

26. The Heads of State or Government endorsed the Malé resolution on youth adopted by the Ministerial Conference on Youth in South Asia held in the

Maldives in May 1994 and noted that the Conference had, inter alia, served to focus attention on the status of the youth and the challenges faced by them. The leaders noted with satisfaction that the agenda for action incorporated in the resolution was being implemented by member States with a view to integrating the youth into the process of national development. They noted with satisfaction that the SAARC youth resolution had been adopted and the SAARC youth awards scheme had been established.

27. The leaders expressed satisfaction on the implementation of the plan of action to mark 1994 as the SAARC Year of the Youth in member States and resolved to continue the momentum generated in member States.

Persons with disability

28. The Heads of State or Government noted with satisfaction that the Ministerial Conference on Disabled Persons was held at Islamabad in December 1993. They endorsed the Islamabad resolution on disabled persons and the recommendations of the Conference and noted that the Conference had further increased awareness among the peoples of South Asia regarding the needs and problems of the disabled persons. They welcomed the activities and programmes launched by the member States in pursuance of the resolution for the protection and promotion of persons with disability.

Shelter

29. The Heads of State or Government, recognizing that housing was a basic right for all people and that, in addition to governmental efforts, private initiatives of the people and non-governmental agencies should be supported, reaffirmed their commitment to work towards the global objective of "Shelter for All by the Year 2000".

Literacy

30. The Heads of State or Government noted that illiteracy was one of the major causes of poverty, backwardness and social injustices and called upon the member States to initiate more concrete programmes aimed at eradicating illiteracy in the region, preferably by the year 2000 A.D. They decided to observe 1996 as the "SAARC Year of Literacy".

Environment

31. Reaffirming the need for a concerted action for the protection and preservation of the environment, the Heads of State or Government expressed their satisfaction over the formulation of a common position by member States prior to the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction and the presentation of the collective position at the Yokohama Conference. They recognized that international cooperation was vital for building up national capabilities, transfer of appropriate technology and promotion of multilateral projects and research efforts in natural disaster reduction.

32. The Heads of State or Government expressed their deep concern at the unabated degradation of the environment and recurrence of devastating natural

disasters. They also underscored the risks and dangers involved in overlooking the challenge posed by those problems. They expressed their commitment to implementing at all levels - national, bilateral, regional and global - programmes for the protection and preservation of the environment and prevention of its degradation. The Heads of State or Government stressed the importance of continuing the ongoing SAARC activities in the field of environment.

33. The Heads of State or Government noted that although some work had been carried out in the area of disseminating information on the problems of environmental degradation and their impact on the region, progress in the implementation of the recommendations of the SAARC regional study on the causes and consequences of natural disasters and the protection and preservation of the environment and the regional study on greenhouse effect and its impact on the region, which were completed in 1992, had been slow. They stressed the importance of effective and speedy implementation of the recommendations of the two studies and requested member States to take all necessary steps without further delay in vital areas such as sharing and developing scientific capabilities to protect and manage the environment. They further directed the Technical Committee on Environment to monitor the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations of the two studies, and submit a report to the ninth summit through the Council of Ministers.

34. The Heads of State or Government recalled the decisions expressed in the Dhaka Declaration of April 1993 on the outcome of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development of June 1992 and reiterated the urgent need to ensure the flow of new and additional resources that were adequate and predictable to implement successfully the programmes of Agenda 21. They also recalled the United Nations minimum target for developed countries of 0.7 per cent of gross national product as official development assistance, a target which was yet to be approximated by most developed countries. The Heads of State or Government also noted that international actions in the area of environmental protection should be based on partnership and collective endeavours and should reflect the principle enunciated in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, of common but differentiated responsibilities. Integral to such actions was the promotion of economic growth in developing countries that was both sustained and sustainable and direct action in eradicating poverty.

35. The Heads of State or Government also noted that the Commission on Sustainable Development set up to monitor the implementation of the Rio agreements had met thrice since their earlier meeting and expressed the hope that the Commission would be able to facilitate the necessary flow of resources and technology.

36. The Heads of State or Government also noted that the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change had both come into force and the first meetings of the conferences of parties to each Convention had been held. Welcoming those developments, they urged that developing countries should be assisted in meeting their commitments under the Conventions. The establishment of the restructured Global Environment Facility was a beginning in that direction. However, the Heads of State or

Government urged that funds of a much larger order would be necessary if the needs of the Conventions were to be met.

Terrorism

37. The Heads of State or Government expressed serious concern on the spread of terrorism in and outside the region and reiterated their unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal. They deplored all such acts for their ruinous impact on life, property, socio-economic development and political stability, as well as on regional and international peace and cooperation.

38. The Heads of State or Government once again emphasized that highest priority should be accorded to the enactment of enabling legislation at the national level to give effect to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. They urged member States that had not yet done so to enact expeditiously enabling legislation at the national level to implement the Convention and reiterated the need for a constant dialogue and interaction among the concerned agencies of member States, including submission of periodic recommendations to the Council of Ministers.

39. They underlined that cooperation among SAARC member States was vital if the scourge of terrorism was to be eliminated from the region.

Drug trafficking

40. The Heads of State or Government recognized that drug abuse and drug trafficking with its linkages with organized crime, illicit arms trade and terrorism continued to pose a serious threat to the security and stability in the region.

41. While noting the efforts made by Member States as well as the regional cooperation under way to combat that pernicious trade, the leaders stressed the urgency of further strengthening the process of cooperation.

42. The leaders welcomed the ratification of the SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances by all member States and entry into force of the Convention in September 1993. They urged all member States to take necessary follow-up action for effective implementation of the Convention.

Science and technology

43. The Heads of State or Government reiterated that cooperation in the area of science and technology should be accorded high priority. Noting that some progress had been made towards establishment of networking arrangements, inter alia, in the fields of biotechnology, genetic engineering, energy modelling techniques and low-cost housing and building technologies, the leaders called for further acceleration of that process.

People-to-people contact

44. Reiterating their earlier resolve to promote further people-to-people contact through increased involvement of the peoples of South Asia in the process of regional cooperation, the Heads of State or Government noted with satisfaction that such interaction had been taking place through various fora both within and outside the SAARC framework and had contributed to the promotion of mutual understanding in the region.

45. The leaders noted that the Association for Persons of the Legal Communities of SAARC Countries (SAARCLAW) had been accorded recognition by SAARC. The leaders hoped that SAARCLAW would play an effective role in fostering closer cooperation among the legal communities in the region.

46. The leaders noted with satisfaction that the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI) had been functioning satisfactorily. They expressed hope that SCCI and its constituent units in the member States would do their utmost to promote trade and economic cooperation in the SAARC region. The leaders commended SCCI for disseminating information on the scope, content and potentials of the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) among the business community in the region.

47. The Heads of State or Government expressed satisfaction that the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme was being implemented smoothly and had enhanced the scope of people-to-people contacts.

South Asian Development Fund (SADF)

48. The Heads of State or Government endorsed the establishment of a three-window South Asian Development Fund (SADF) with the merger of SAARC Fund for Regional Projects and the SAARC Regional Fund and a third window for social development and infrastructure development.

Projection of collective positions

49. The Heads of State or Government recalled their decision taken at the seventh SAARC summit regarding development of collective positions in international forums on such issues as would enhance the international profile of South Asia and would enable the member States to articulate their position on them more effectively. They noted that the Council of Ministers had formulated a procedure for the projection of SAARC collective positions at such international forums.

50. They noted with satisfaction that pursuant to the decision at the seventh SAARC summit, collective positions had been formulated by member States and presented at the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction and the World Summit for Social Development. The leaders also noted with satisfaction that a SAARC collective position would also be presented at the Fourth World Conference on Women at Beijing in September 1995.

Security of small States

51. The Heads of State or Government, reaffirming their commitment to universally accepted principles and norms relating to the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of all States, recognized that small States, because of their particular problems, required special measures of support for safeguarding their independence and territorial integrity. They reiterated that real protection of small and weaker States should be firmly rooted in the rule of law. This, they stressed, should be ensured by all countries either severally or collectively through the pursuit of appropriate actions.

International political developments

52. The Heads of State or Government noted that the end of the cold war had resulted in fundamental changes in the political landscape. It was therefore important that a new idiom be found to address new concerns. The disappearance of the confrontation between the two Power blocs presented an opportunity towards building a genuine consensus for a new international order.

53. The Heads of State or Government had wide-ranging discussions on the current global political trends and future prospects, particularly those issues that concerned South Asia. In that context, they reiterated their deep commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed their resolve to strengthen the United Nations as the central instrument for peace, security, disarmament, development and cooperation among the nations of the world. While pledging their support to all constructive initiatives aimed at strengthening the United Nations, the leaders emphasized that such initiatives must be undertaken with the sole objective of rendering the United Nations and all its organs more democratic, efficient and effective and not to limit the focus of its attention to a narrow and isolated range of objectives.

54. Appreciating the role of some SAARC member States in United Nations peace-keeping operations in various parts of the world, the Heads of State or Government felt that such participation had contributed towards maintenance of peace and security in the world.

55. The Heads of State or Government reiterated their firm commitment to the principles and objectives of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and underlined the continued validity and relevance of these principles and objectives in the contemporary world. They recalled the stabilizing role played by the Movement in global affairs since its inception. They expressed their deep conviction that the Movement's innate strength equipped it to continue to play a most constructive role in laying the foundations of a new world order based on the rule of law, non-discrimination, equity and cooperation.

56. The Heads of State or Government noted that while the international community had successfully created the norm against chemical and biological weapons, it had, unfortunately, been unable to do the same with regard to nuclear weapons. The leaders were convinced that more needed to be done and at a far greater pace. Reiterating that the utmost priority was to be given to nuclear disarmament, given the danger posed by nuclear weapons, they urged the

Conference on Disarmament to negotiate an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and to undertake negotiations for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

57. The Heads of State or Government expressed their strong commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights. They agreed to take all necessary steps to achieve that objective.

International economic and social issues

58. The Heads of State or Government welcomed the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and reaffirmed their commitment to implement fully and as scheduled the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. They also welcomed the coming into existence of the WTO and expressed the hope that it would help to expand international trade, particularly that of the developing countries. They reaffirmed the immediate need to elaborate policies to enable developing countries to take advantage of expanded international trading opportunities, in the context of the full implementation of the Round. They called upon all countries to refrain from any unilateral measure not in accordance with international law, the Charter of the United Nations and enlightened regionalism and globalism that created obstacles to trade relations among States and thereby impeded the full realization of social and economic development.

59. Recognizing that the promotion of mutually reinforcing broad-based sustained economic growth on a global scale, as well as a non-discriminatory and multilateral rule-based international trading system, provided a basis for social development, the Heads of State or Government called for the establishment of an open, equitable, cooperative and mutually beneficial international economic environment. They also called for a reduction of trade barriers and promotion of expanded access to global markets.

60. The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed their commitment to safeguard the basic interests of workers. They called upon countries to refrain from erecting trade barriers in the guise of promotion and protection of workers' rights. They deplored the tendency to impose any conditionalities on international trade, whether as a "social clause" or as the "environmental clause", while reiterating their commitment to ensuring workers' rights as well as protection of the environment.

Special measures for the least developed and land-locked countries

61. The Heads of State or Government noted with deep concern that economic growth in the least developed countries and land-locked countries was not satisfactory and emphasized the need to take special measures for accelerating the process of development. They reiterated the need to fulfil the internationally agreed aid targets for the developing countries and the least developed countries. They emphasized on the need for exceptional finance to facilitate implementation of economic reform programmes in SAARC countries.

Dates and venue of the ninth meeting of the SAARC Heads of State or Government

62. The Heads of State or Government gratefully accepted the offer of the Government of Maldives to host the ninth SAARC summit. The dates would be finalized in consultation with member States.

63. The Heads of State or Government of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka expressed their deep appreciation for the exemplary manner in which the Prime Minister of India had discharged his responsibilities as Chairman of the meeting. They expressed their profound gratitude for the warm and gracious hospitality extended to them by the Government and the people of the Republic of India and for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting.

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/216
S/1995/476
12 June 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Items 39, 75 and 81 of
the preliminary list*
LAW OF THE SEA
STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN REGION
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 9 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions of my Government and referring to the resolution adopted yesterday, 8 June 1995, by the Turkish National Assembly through which it transfers to the Turkish Government its competences, including those that will be deemed necessary, from a military point of view, for the maintenance and the defence of the vital interests of Turkey if Greece implements the Convention on the Law of the Sea, which the Greek Parliament ratified last week, I would like to bring the following to your attention.

It is beyond any doubt that the above-mentioned resolution constitutes a direct violation of article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, which stipulates that "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State", as well as of many similar provisions of international treaties and conventions. What Turkey is in fact attempting to do is to intimidate Greece into forfeiting a right acknowledged to all signatory parties, by article 3 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, and already exercised by a large number of States.

* A/50/50/Rev.1.

It is not the first time that Turkey flagrantly violates international law. It should be noted however that this time the contempt of international lawderives from the legislative body of a country which, having already been charged with past and recent violations of international law, is seeking closer political and economic cooperation with the democratic countries of the European Union.

The Greek Government attaches a particular importance to the Turkish threat, all the more so since the latter emanates from a neighbouring and allied country and is not, obviously, intended to prevent the commitment of an illegal act, but, on the contrary, to prevent the implementation of rules and rights deriving from international law.

The argument contained in the said resolution, namely that the legal status of the Aegean Sea has been defined by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 and that an eventual decision of the Greek side to extend its national territorial waters to 12 miles would reverse this status, is totally unfounded, since the rights of the coastal countries are defined by the international law of the sea, both conventional and customary.

Moreover, the Turkish allegation regarding the obstruction of the freedom of navigation in the Aegean Sea is also unfounded, since Greece has always made clear that it does not intend to deprive ships of other nations of their right of innocent passage, in conformity with international law.

In the same context, it should be noted that Turkey, contrary to the provisions of the Montreaux Convention of 1936 on the Status of the Straits, has recently adopted domestic legislation, imposing serious restrictions on the freedom of navigation through the straits.

The fact that the Turkish National Assembly has decided to transfer to the Turkish Government its above-mentioned competences confirms very clearly the well-known Turkish claims against the Greek islands of the Aegean and the sovereign rights of Greece regarding its national territorial waters and airspace.

It should be underlined that the said resolution of the Turkish National Assembly is only one of a series of recent Turkish provocative acts that lead to the conclusion that Turkey is seeking the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations, thus creating dangerous implications for peace and stability in the region.

In the light of the above, a comparison of the difference in mentality between the two countries is inevitable, since Turkey's target seems to be the deterioration of the political climate in the Balkans, while Greece is undertaking serious and difficult initiatives in an effort to restore peace in the same area.

In concluding, I would like to reiterate the official position of the Greek Government that Greece intends to exercise its right to extend its territorial waters up to 12 miles, in accordance with international law, when this is considered appropriate.

I would like to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under items 39, 75 and 81 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Christos G. ZACHARAKIS
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **A**

General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/217
13 June 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

Fiftieth session
Item 70 of the preliminary list*

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Letter dated 12 June 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the address given on 8 June 1995 by His Excellency the President of Kazakstan, N. A. Nazarbaev, to the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex distributed as an official document of the General Assembly under item 70 of the preliminary list.

(Signed) Akmaral Kh. ARYSTANBEKOVA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Kazakstan
to the United Nations

* A/50/50/Rev.1.

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Annex

Address given on 8 June 1995 by the President of Kazakstan to the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva

I extend my warmest greetings to the participants at this session of the Conference on Disarmament.

It seems to me highly symbolic that the admission of the Republic of Kazakstan as an observer to the Conference on Disarmament should coincide with the destruction of the last nuclear explosive device at the former Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakstan.

However, I do not want to confine my speech to a simple enumeration of the steps taken by Kazakstan in the sphere of disarmament. These steps have been highly praised by the major world Powers and by international organizations, and they are well known to all participants at this session. Because Kazakstan has taken these steps, the security of its territorial integrity has been guaranteed by the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, China and France.

The theme of my speech is quite different, namely, "New challenges and a new vision of disarmament processes and global security".

Put another way, what stage of the process of world disarmament and global security have we reached today, in the mid-1990s, and what new challenges will require a response from us by the end of the century?

It seems perfectly clear that the purpose of disarmament lies outside the disarmament process itself. This is obvious. It is a sorry gardener who busies himself with flowers alone. Unless he keeps an eye on the heavens, storms and tempests will catch him unawares.

In exactly the same way, our criteria for judging the effectiveness of the disarmament process are introduced by society and the public at large from the realms of creativity and development which exist independently of the actual process.

The success of the disarmament process is not only measurable in terms of the percentage of warheads, delivery vehicles, tanks and guns that are scrapped; it can also be gauged by the increased availability of benefits for ordinary people.

Genuine security does not mean cutting back on weapons, it means an increased birth rate since mothers no longer fear for their children's future in giving birth to them.

Most important of all, the success of the disarmament process is linked to and determined by the effectiveness of existing international security systems.

Seven years ago, at the third special session on disarmament held in July 1988, it was noted that disarmament is not the sole responsibility of a handful of powerful States but a joint undertaking of all States.

I should like to develop this idea in a broader context: building an effective global system of international security is a joint undertaking of all States, and disarmament is one of the goals of this "universal joint undertaking".

If we look at the disarmament process in this light, we can see that a number of very serious problems are currently brewing.

Problem number 1 - How effective are the existing systems of international security and disarmament processes?

If we judge the quality of international security by such objective indicators of the disruption of civilian life as the number of refugees, we see that the number of refugees world wide has increased hundreds of times over during the last decade.

Whereas in 1983 there were just nine countries where the total number of refugees exceeded 50,000 inhabitants, 10 years later this category included 31 countries and millions of people had become refugees. As we can see, the number of such countries more than tripled in the space of a single decade.

Thus, in assessing the effectiveness of disarmament processes and international security, we should have the courage to acknowledge that the potential for conflict in the world has increased significantly in recent decades.

It is now becoming obvious that this potential is not limited to the traditional indicators of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, the reduction of which has for the last quarter of a century been at the centre of the debate.

It is equally clear that existing international security systems cannot really be deemed effective if they are unable to halt an increase in tension.

Disarmament processes and the establishment of international security systems were by and large successful in the 40 years following the end of the Second World War.

However, since the mid-1980s we have witnessed a sea change in the global situation. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the disbanding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and other trends were never envisaged when the existing international security systems were established.

Today, it is becoming increasingly clear that existing international security systems and the disarmament processes which they embrace need to be reinterpreted and fundamentally reworked.

The increasingly explosive situation in the Balkans provides ample confirmation of this fact. This hotbed of conflict is continuing to flare up despite all the efforts of international security structures.

In our view, the conflict ceased to be a purely local concern long ago; it is now a regional matter. And there is a danger that it could soon develop into a continental conflict.

It seems clear that conflicts of this sort should be extinguished at the earliest possible stage, while they are still being fought out at the regional level. Effective regional security systems are needed to achieve this.

Such an approach would significantly reduce the likelihood of regional conflicts taking on a continental or global dimension, as we are currently observing in the former Yugoslavia.

This implies that a new vision of international security systems and disarmament processes is required in order to meet the familiar challenges of the 1980s and 1990s.

Problem number 2 - What will be the direction of change in the potential for world conflict by the end of this century?

We can answer this question by recognizing that regional, continental and global international security systems and the disarmament processes they embrace basically stem from the economic and strategic interests of the countries and groups of States which comprise them.

History shows us that international security systems are always based on a perception of the common interests of the participating countries; these interests are primarily economic, but they may also be geoeconomic, geofinancial and geostrategic.

Consequently, the direction of change in the potential for world conflict by the end of the century will largely be determined by global geoeconomic trends in the late 1990s.

Over the past decade, it has become clear that global geoeconomic trends include the formation of three major new world economic centres - in North America, Western Europe and South-East Asia. It seems likely that the coming century will also witness the "awakening" of the African continent.

The main features of these three centres of world influence will probably become clearer sometime around the end of this century and the beginning of the next.

Obviously, this search for a new balance of world economic forces will undoubtedly lead to a search for a new world strategic balance, including a balance in the sphere of security systems and the ongoing processes of armament and disarmament which such systems embrace.

If these trends accelerate, there is every reason to suppose that the potential for world conflict will also increase by the end of the century and thus present us with new challenges.

It follows that the "universal joint undertaking" to build international security systems and to disarm should compel us to join forces now with a view to formulating a new vision of the new challenges arising at the end of the 1990s.

Problem number 3 - The involvement of third world players in disarmament talks

It is widely acknowledged that, thus far, the most important disarmament talks have been conducted between the major Powers of East and West without the involvement of representatives of the third world.

How productive will this approach be at the end of the 1990s?

I shall dwell on security problems in Europe and Asia, since these are the ones which most directly affect my country, the Republic of Kazakstan.

It is perfectly clear to us in Kazakstan, situated as we are at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, that the West is building new international security systems based on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the resources and structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Meanwhile, to the east and south-east, the Asian countries members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) will probably look for ways to cooperate politically and militarily within their own structures.

It is immediately obvious that a solid vertical bloc of Eurasian countries stretching from Russia in the north to India in the south (including the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan) currently do not belong in either the Western or the Eastern camp.

I would call this solid geopolitical belt of countries, located along a meridian in the centre of Eurasia, the "belt of uncertainty" or the "belt of expectation".

Despite the internal differences among the countries located in this "belt of uncertainty", they form a fairly integrated bloc in terms of their potential to influence not just the balance of power in Asia or Eurasia but even the geopolitical balance of the entire world.

Security problems in Europe and particularly in Asia, and any issues involving cooperation between the world economic centres of Western Europe and South-East Asia, will depend to a considerable extent on how the countries of this geopolitical "belt of uncertainty" define their position and direction.

The largest and most powerful of these countries is definitely Russia. The stability of Eurasia and the changes that take place there will to a great extent be determined by the choices that Russia makes.

All in all, Russia is faced with three choices. The first is to ally itself with Western European structures, but these structures do not want to admit Russia. The second is to draw closer to East Asian structures, but here the same problem arises. The third option is to weld all the countries of the "belt of uncertainty" into a single group founded on the principle of equality, thereby establishing a third security system on the Eurasian continent.

The remaining Asian countries of the "belt of uncertainty" have just two options - either to look eastward, or to build their own third security system and tackle disarmament issues inside this bloc.

Yet another new aspect of the problem of transforming the security and disarmament systems in Eurasia, which had not been apparent earlier, emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Today, most of the new independent States of the former socialist camp are thinking primarily about setting up their own national security structures.

I would call this new factor "new autonomous security". It cannot but be accompanied by an arms increase in these countries. It is completely natural to seek to rely first of all on oneself and one's armed forces and then subsequently on some sort of security system and participation in the disarmament process.

It should also be kept in mind that the disarmament process may be used by certain countries as a means of modernizing their weapons.

This "new autonomous security" situation requires a completely different framework for building an international security system.

Under these circumstances, such systems cannot be built from the top down. In all likelihood, it will be more acceptable in this case to build gradually one's own armed forces and then a regional security system, and only afterwards to participate in existing continental and global international security systems and the corresponding disarmament processes.

Therefore, the new geopolitical situation has also resulted in a new role for the developing countries (or the third-world countries) in the processes of disarmament and the building of international security systems.

The time factor alone requires that the United Nations and other world disarmament and international security structures should strongly emphasize patronage and the establishment first of all of effective regional security systems. Then, on that basis, existing continental structures for international security must be transformed or new ones created.

An analysis of the security problems on the Eurasian continent indicates that the third-world or developing countries must be involved on an equal footing in all disarmament negotiation processes.

This will make it possible to eliminate the inherent tendency of the great Powers to needlessly ideologize disarmament processes. It may also give rise to a new vision of the new challenges to international security and disarmament systems.

On the basis of its own vision of the three international security and disarmament problems pointed out above, my country, the Republic of Kazakstan, has been resolutely and actively participating in all processes aimed at setting up security and disarmament systems at all levels of international cooperation in Eurasia.

First, this relates to our policy of combining the efforts of three Central Asian States - Kazakstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan - in maintaining peace and stability in Central Asia.

Second, it involves Kazakstan's active policy of integration into the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the field of international security and disarmament.

Third, this is reflected in Kazakstan's initiatives aimed at the convening of a conference on cooperation and confidence-building measures in Asia. It involves the long-term work of setting up modern security and cooperation structures, on the basis of which it will be possible in time to begin negotiations on disarmament on the Asian continent.

Fourth, it relates to Kazakstan's participation in the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Partnership for Peace programme, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT-I, as well as the Disarmament Commission.

The Republic of Kazakstan, in all its practical foreign-policy steps relating to international security and disarmament questions, acts on the basis of the two principles of the new vision referred to above.

First - "proceeding from an understanding of the new geoeconomic trends to a search for new approaches to disarmament by improving existing international security systems and establishing new ones".

Second - "proceeding from the building of regional disarmament systems to the search for effective ways to enhance global security systems by improving and transforming continental security systems".

I believe that this approach to developing a new vision of international security and disarmament will enable us to find appropriate responses to the new challenges arising at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the next century.

Unless these general questions are resolved, we shall always come up against obstacles, unexpected developments and unsolvable problems in dealing with particular practical disarmament issues.

I believe that the Conference on Disarmament will be unable to avoid dealing with these questions, which are raised by life itself, and in time will find the appropriate responses.

I should like in particular to stress that the practical steps taken by the Republic of Kazakstan in the field of international security and disarmament are designed first of all to ensure the unconditional and complete implementation of all international treaties and agreements in that area which we have signed and to which we are a party.

Our deeds speak for us.

Almost five years ago, we were the first of the CIS countries to remove all tactical nuclear weapons from our territory.

Kazakstan was the first of the countries that are parties to the Lisbon Protocol to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and we closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.

The removal of more than 1,200 intercontinental ballistic-missile nuclear warheads from the territory of the Republic of Kazakstan was completed in April of this year. The last nuclear warhead stored underground at the Semipalatinsk test site was destroyed on 30 May.

Now, the territory of Kazakstan is completely free of nuclear weapons.

It is precisely these practical steps by my country and our firm commitment to all international agreements concluded that allow us to raise the question of how and on what basis the search for new approaches to international security and disarmament issues can be carried out.

It is precisely on the basis of our firm position that I can ask myself and you the questions that were heard earlier.

I clearly see that the task of solving these three problems may, to some extent, be beyond the competence of the participants at the current session and the Conference on Disarmament as a whole.

It is precisely this clear realization which allows me to address you directly since I am sure that real success in the disarmament process first of all depends on personal efforts, a wealth of experience and the talents of all persons present in this hall, of all the, figuratively speaking, "tireless workers of the world's joint enterprise for disarmament and security".

I also clearly see that raising these three problems to a certain extent may transcend traditional notions about the contemporary disarmament processes.

But I explained that the purpose of my statement to you was precisely to expand our vision of disarmament problems for meeting the new challenges and to proceed beyond the traditional conceptual framework of disarmament.

The Conference on Disarmament is facing new challenges arising from the new situation resulting from the profound world-wide changes of the 1980s and the 1990s.

We must find a new vision of international security and disarmament problems in order to have the means to deal with these new challenges and in order to identify them correctly.

Under these new conditions, therefore, disarmament amounts to arming oneself with a new vision of the new challenges. And I believe that we shall find an appropriate response.

We welcome the re-establishment, within the framework of the Conference, of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and note with satisfaction the start of multilateral negotiations in this area.

Kazakstan has three modern seismic stations capable of recording underground phenomena at a distance of thousands of kilometres. We are offering to link these stations to a global monitoring network, which can become an effective verification instrument.

We appeal to the nuclear Powers to extend the moratorium on nuclear tests until the signing of the corresponding treaty and call upon those who are continuing to conduct tests to join in the moratorium.